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Abstract
Phenomenological foundations for grammar description of the natural language
are under considerations. The picture of language world based on the factoriza-
tion of communication and cognitivity is proposed. The problem of observability–
unobservability in linguistics is discussed. The concept of the states of language
units is formulated both with its interpretation in the formal definition of the noun’s
case. System analysis of the complexity in cognitive processes is considered.
Keywords: phenomenological approach; grammar description of the language;
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Logical and phenomenological foundations for grammar description of
language
Grammatical problems have lately been in the range of interests of not only the-
oretical linguists that have to deal with them, so to speak, on duty, but more —
applied scientists who create systems of computer processing of language. The
concept of this study includes a wide range of problems related to information re-
trieval, translation from one language to another, knowledge engineering, speech
recognition and synthesis of text and images, the interpretation of the content of
texts, various linguistic expertise, language training, etc. Grammatical description
for the selected range of tasks is interested mainly in the sense that it provides
an interpretation of linguistic objects by their form which is crucial in formalizing
herein since formalization (as deeply as possible) is a necessary condition for the
creation of efficient artifacts endowed with intellectual properties that carry out
the linguistic processing.
The experience of building any theory says that the success of the formalization
description of a subject area is related directly to the choice of adequate facilities for
conceptual representation of phenomena. The above fully applies to the grammar.
It should, however, be admitted that when creating grammatical patterns their
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authors often tend to narrow the field of linguistic phenomenology, so that their
constructions are sometimes of quite a limited scope. Of course, this restriction
greatly simplifies the task of researchers, but the pay for this simplification is lack of
adequacy of the description, its correspondence to the phenomenology of language
rather incomplete and insufficient for applications and, ultimately, ineffectiveness
of the final product, namely linguistic technologies.
It is clear that the scope of the field of linguistic phenomenology is not fixed
and is subject to confirmation in connection with the tasks that are to be addressed
in the research process. Moreover, there may be very different approaches to de-
termining the very principles on which the said specification is to be implemented.
In this regard, we want to quote the words of Isaac Newton from his first scientific
study written in the age of eighteen, called «The Universal Language» (Newton,
1957)1 and devoted to fundamental grammatical problems, «The Dialects of each
Laguage being soe divers & arbitrary A generall Language cannot bee so fitly deduced
from them as from ye natures of things themselves wch is ye same to all Nations
& by wch all Laguage was at ye first composed. Now ye frame of Beings is made
up of severall substances (bodys & spirits) each of woh are in this or that state case
or Condition And ye use of Language is yt one man may signify to another in wt
state any substance is, hath beene, shall bee, may bee, should bee, is wished to bee,
is commaunded to bee &c These & such like considerations may bee an Induction
to ye following rules».
From this brief snippet it follows quite unequivocally that Isaac Newton, in for-
mulating the original principles of the theoretical and linguistic concepts, suggested
the lack of what nowadays is called «linguistic material», and expanded the bound-
aries of the phenomenology of language until the «nature of things themselves,
which is the same for all people and on which the whole language was originally
created» (Newton, 1957). In the 21st century one quite understands the whole
enormous complexity of Isaac Newton’s attempts to derive the system language
from «nature of things themselves», but today we cannot fail to admire the intel-
lectual athleticism of the young genius who made so a bold attempt more than 350
years ago.
On the other hand, this attempt can be described as the apotheosis of the
phenomenological approach to the study of language. Because the nature of things
«appears» to a subject or is «given» to him through his awareness of a set of
events that eventually become facts of language. The methodological setting on the
output of the language from the nature of things seems to be especially valuable,
as it introduces the language into the general range of phenomena and entities as
a manifestation of the general nature of things.
Of course, in determining the boundaries of linguistic phenomenology some
moderation must be followed so that theoretical constructs can possibly end not
only in the formulation of general principles, but also results useful for practical
applications. And despite the fact that the self-esteem of many linguists may be
flattered with the expression of the Apostle John «In the beginning was the Word,
1This work was published only in 1957.
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and the Word was with God, and the Word was God»,2 that introduces original
language tools into the arsenal of the Creator the reasonable beginnings of the
nature of things in relation to language learning should, perhaps, be attributed to
the later stages of the evolution of the world.
However, speaking about the evolution of language, we cannot forget about the
creationist view of its nature. Here is how, somewhat ironically, describes the act
of creation of language Umberto Eco by mouth of one of the main characters of the
novel «The Name of the Rose» Honorable William of Baskerville:
«God had told Adam not to eat of the tree of good and evil, and that was
divine law; but then He had authorized, or, rather, encouraged, Adam
to give things names, and on that score He had allowed His terrestrial
subject free rein. In fact, though some in our times say that nomina sunt
consequentia rerum,3 the book of Genesis is actually quite explicit on this
point: God brought all the animals unto Adam to see what he would call
them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the
name thereof. And though surely the first man had been clever enough
to call, in his Adamic language, every thing and animal according to
its nature, nevertheless he was exercising a kind of sovereign right in
imagining the name that in his opinion best corresponded to that nature.
Because, in fact, it is now known that men impose different names to
designate concepts, though only the concepts, signs of things, are the
same for all. So that surely the word «nomen» comes from «nomos»,
that is to say «law», since nomina are given by men ad placitum, in
other words by free and collective accord.» (Eco, 1983, p. 93).
Thus, we can assume that Isaac Newton attempted to do what had actually
been done by Adam. In fact, according to William of Baskerville, Adam “in calling
every thing and every animal in his Eden language, was guided by the nature of the
called.” Although it is not entirely clear where the First Man knew this nature from
(perhaps he was advised by the Creator), the methodological setting to be guided
by the nature of things when naming them is quite clear. Similarly, it becomes
clear why Newton, not having a sufficient knowledge of the nature of things by
his age of eighteen, but still wanting to implement this knowledge in his theory of
language, devoted most of his academic life to just knowing the nature of things.
Speaking of evolutionism and creationism in relation to language, we cannot fail
to mention opinions on the subject of such authority as Wilhelm von Humboldt,
who said: «Whatever natural may seem to us to assume a gradual formation of
the language, it could appear just at once. < . . .> In order that people could
understand even one single word, it all well and in all its relationships should be
embedded in them» (Humboldt, 1999). Our own observations on the language sys-
tem relations that occur in large glossaries (Shyrokov, 2011, pp. 260–264), confirm
the Humboldt’s opinions, but today we are not prepared to give preference in the
subject either to evolutionism or creationism.
2The Gospel of St. John, 1:1
3The names of the original essence of things (Latin).
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In connection with the phenomenology of language we turn to the views of the
brightest representative of the phenomenological trend in the 20th century philos-
ophy, namely Edmund Husserl. In the third volume of his «Logical studies», he
writes, «Modern Grammar believes that it should be based solely on psychology or
other empirical sciences. In contrast, we see here that the old idea of general and
particularly a priori grammar is (because we discover the laws that determine the
possible forms of meanings) an indubitable foundation and at least some definitely
highlighted scope of its significance (Gültigkeit). To what extent can be detected
even other areas of the proper grammatical Apriori, is beyond the scope of our in-
terests. Inside the pure logic there is a sphere of laws abstracted from any objectivity.
These laws, in contrast to the usual laws of logic in their strict and usual sense, one
could justifiably call {pure logico-grammatical (reinlogisch-grammatische)}. {And it
would be even better oppose the pure doctrine of significance (reine Geltungslehre)
to the pure doctrine of form of meanings, preceded by the former.}»
At first glance it seems that in this case phenomenologist Husserl opts in favor of
apriorism. However, the past century, with its great discoveries in the field of logic
(associated with the names of F. Frege, G. Cantor, B. Russell, A. N. Whitehead,
D. Hilbert, K. Gödel, L. Wittgenstein, A. Tarski, L. Brouwer, L. Zadeh and oth-
ers), as well as quantum-relativistic physics (A. Einstein, H. Poincaré, M. Planck,
N. Bohr, L. de Broglie, W. Heisenberg, E. Schrödinger, P. Dirac, M. Bourne,
J. von Neumann, R. Feynman and others) so expanded the concept of logic while
bringing it closer to the subject and the substance that the combination of logic
and grammar by Husserl already looks not the way it was seen, for example, by
rationalist R. Descartes in the 17th century. So Husserl’s remarks, we think, may be
interpreted in a phenomenological spirit, and «pure logico-grammatical (reinlogisch-
grammatische) laws» by Husserl in its conceptual epistemology is quite comparable
to the «nature of things» by Isaac Newton.
What are the common features of the «nature of things» that are reflected in
linguistic forms? For an answer we turn to what we call the picture of the lingual
world. L. Wittgenstein put it aphoristically: «The limits of my language define the
limits of my world». Earlier W. von Humboldt in a letter to F. Wolf wrote in 1804:
«I was able to open — and I am more and more concerned about it — that through
language one can look around the highest and deepest areas and the diversity of the
world.».
Picture of the language worldand its conceptual representation
The picture of the lingual world can be clearly represented as follows in Fig. 1.
In this scheme the external impressions of the world through perceptual-sensory
apparatus of the human (the subject of the language-thinking process), are trans-
formed and fall into his/her thought-speech apparatus to be there processed and
acquire a linguistic form. The exchange of information expressed verbally with
another subject of the thought-speech process is being carried out through the
communication system, i.e. the infrastructure of language.
Even from such a lapidary scheme fairly certain conclusions about the structure
of language can be derived. First, it is the conclusion on a relative stability of forms
the linguistic structures acquire in evolution. Communicants (participants of the
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Figure 1:
communication process) must exchange information in the agreed data «formats»
and «protocols», since without them the communication is impossible at all. It is
clear that these tools of data exchange «standardization» certainly should not be
modified in the communication process (or can change only slightly), what pro-
vides the necessary stability of forms of the linguistic structures. The second point
concerns specificity and diversity of forms, in which the linguistic data elements
are implemented in the circuits and paths of thought-speech and communication
processes. As noted by Pitts and McCulloch:4 “The language by which information
is transmitted (in the brain) . . . cannot and should not meet the language that people
use to communicate with each other.” This is understandable, since different tasks
are being solved, in fact, in the language-thinking and the communication processes
to require different tools for their solution. While the communication system’s func-
tion is only to transfer voice data without or only with a minimal distortion, the
language-thinking apparatus solves much more diverse tasks: encoding, decoding,
analysis, synthesis, transformation, interpretation, conceptualization, comparison,
memorization, short- and long-term storage, etc. These processes occur in different
environments and in different, so to speak, hardware and software implementations.
We believe that the properties of information and peculiarities of information pro-
cesses, in general, depend on the physical substrate in which they are implemented.
The last statement finds its justification in quantum information, its research hav-
ing been particularly active lately.5
The first question that arises in the formulation of principles of modeling the
language substance is the issue of objects to be modelled, namely: What are the
objects of language and what, in fact, are we going to model? In this paper we take
as a starting position that the language’s own objects are certain psychophysical
states and processes in the language-thinking apparatus of the human, and both
4See: Prybram, 1975.
5See: Khrennikov, 2008 and numerous refers in it and articles in: Europhysics Letters, Journal
of Applied Physics, Journal of the Optical Society of America, Nature Photonics, Nature Physics,
New Journal of Physics.
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oral and written forms of language are the elements of the infrastructure of the
lingual process. This statement is slightly different from the point of view usual for
the traditional linguistics, according to which the substance of language is a sound
substance that forms a lingual substratum to be studied and simulated. We proceed
from the obvious fact that the language does not occur in the vocal cords — its
origin is much deeper and the sound form already belongs to the infrastructure of
the lingual, or more precisely, the language-thinking process.
Obviously, the language-thinking process itself is integrated and contains both
linguistic and mental components. In the language-thinking apparatus it is real-
ized as a dynamic system of interrelated reflexes. Their content and nature are
studied, for example, in the book by V. M. Bekhterev published as early as in
1909 but having not lost since then its relevance, as well as the above-mentioned
monograph by K. Prybram and a number of other works. According to the views of
V. M. Bekhterev (1991) the natural language is one of the so-called connective re-
flexes that occur in the human brain. Thus, the separation of the lingual processes
from the mental ones adopted by many linguists as well as attempts of learning
language «by itself» seems to us an unreasonable and methodologically incorrect
simplification. The language system should be regarded as an open one, providing
both a significant expansion of the phenomenological basis of language, and the
corresponding modification of conceptual tools.
Oral and written forms of the language in this sense act as models of speech-
thinking processes and at the same time — of their communicative environment
(infrastructure). With this factorization we can argue that they are the linguistic
periphery.
We make, however, a reservation regarding a possible underestimation of the
infrastructure components of language that may be due to the fact that psycho-
physical conditions and processes of speech-thinking system are considered by us to
be the «main» primary lingual objects. The fact is that the current evidence sug-
gests that knowledge of language and its proficiency are not innate human qualities.
It is only the ability of language acquisition that is innate and for this purpose there
are certain areas responsible for language in the human brain from birth. A process
of «installation» of language in humans necessarily requires such infrastructure el-
ements as the so-called «external» and «egocentric» speeches that function on the
early stages of phylogenetic development of language in children and end with the
formation of his «inner» speech to crown the process of creating a full speech ap-
paratus (Vygotski˘ı, 1999). Thus, the language periphery is an inseparable element
of the language system. In addition, it is one of the elements that provide its
information openness.
It should be noted that the psychophysical conditions and processes (and the
language-thinking one among them) are usually not fully accessible to direct ob-
servation, and certainly not to objective fixation. Oral and written forms of the
language, in fact, are representatives of the observed components of states of lan-
guage objects and processes that occur in the language-thinking apparatus. As
such, they are used as basic objects in the conceptual modeling of language. This
circumstance further emphasizes the importance of the language periphery in the
study of language. Thus, in the picture of lingual world we can identify observable
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Figure 2: Picture of the lingual world.
and directly unobservable components of the language-thinking process as shown
on the Fig. 2.
We are aware of this factorization to be conventional, because some elements of
the language-thinking processes nowadays are observable (but only some of them).
However, in what kinds of form, shape, formats the speech data are stored, what
is the model structure and the types of these data — all of this still cannot be
observed directly, and it is unknown if it is possible in principle.
In this regard, we turn to the analysis of the idea or principle of observability.
This principle laid as the basis for A. Einstein’s special theory of relativity and
developed in some detail in the justification of quantum mechanics, has been very
productive as a method in describing complex processes. As A. Einstein noted in
his discussion with W. Heisenberg in 1926 when disputing about the foundations
of quantum mechanics,6 a theory cannot be constructed with observables alone
(although without them any scientific theory is impossible at all). Only the theory
itself must determine which of its variables are directly unobservable, and which
are not. In particular, in quantum mechanics the states, generally speaking, are
not directly observable. The latter ones match operators of a certain type that act
in the space of states, their eigenvalues do represent the observed values.
Thus, in the world and therefore in the knowledge there is «invisible» that can-
not be observed directly. This gives us the basis for recognition of the role of faith
in the cognitive and intellectual processes, which in the words of the Apostle Paul
is «confidence in the unseen».7 It should, however, be recognized that some deeper
epistemological reasons of observability–unobservability are not disclosed in the
6This discussion is described in detail by W. Heisenberg in his book «Part and the whole»:
(Ge˘ızenberg, 1989, pp. 191–196).
7«Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen». The Letter
to the Hebrews, 11:1.
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quantum theory. In our opinion, these reasons are rooted in the phenomenology of
complexity of the manifested existence. Any reality being an object of observation
(in other words, entering into a relationship «subject–object») exerts its essence in
some limited forms accessible for perception by the subject.8 Shown by the com-
plexity of these forms (potentially infinite — as matter has no limits of divisibility,
so to speak, «in depth» and does not allow control of all of its relationships and me-
diations) appears compensated, consistent with the «perceptual–sensory» devices
subject or device (which, in fact, one and the same), which accepts these forms.
The mechanism of self-compensation of complexity seems to us as so a universal
«universal» of the relation «subject–object» that it should perhaps be attributed
to the basic principles of system analysis. Note that here we understand the com-
plexity as a positive scientific category for which some precise and even formal
definitions can be formulated like those that occur in the theory of Kolmogorov
(1987, pp. 213–223) and in numerous applications and generalizations of this the-
ory, where the concept of complexity is manifested as directly related to the concept
of information.
The first idea of linguistic states and the associated notion of grammat-
ical observed
Based on our belief that neither language units immediately nor grammatical or
semantic categories should be the objects of conceptual representation in linguistics
but entities «intermediate» in respect of language with psychophysical conditions
and processes that have place in the language-thinking apparatus of human as
their phenomenological correlates we are to find out their role in the modeling
language and recall in this regard the initiative of the great Russian mathematician
A. N. Kolmogorov, which, as far as we know, was the first to use the concept of
word states when attempting to build a strict definition of case in Russian.
A. N. Kolmogorov did not publish their papers in linguistics, so in our exposition
of his ideas we follow V. A. Uspensky (1957, pp. 11–18), as in this paper they were
originally presented. Let us turn to the Kolmogorov–Uspensky approach concerning
the definition of case that we present below with our comments. We give the
V. Uspensky’s text in italics while our comments are numbered and presented in
Roman type.
Thus, Kolmogorov proposed a definition of case as follows.
§1
Objects can be in different states. Thus, the object named «молоко»
(«milk» — editor’s note) in Russian may be in the following states: it
can boil, it can be absent, it can be drunk by a cat, it can be drunk
by a dog etc. The states are expressed in language through sentences
which involve a noun that is the name of this object. The above states
8In this regard, recall the famous saying of Einstein: “God is quaint, but not evil,” which
emphasized that at each stage of the knowledge the world manifests itself in finite forms of
complexity, which make knowledge possible.
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of milk are expressed in Russian sentences such as «молоко кипит»,
«молока нет», «кошка пьёт молоко», «собака пьёт молоко». When
expressing states in which there is an appropriate object with the help
of sentences, its name is used in one form or another (in the examples
above — «молоко», «молока»).
Comment 1. As you can see, there Kolmogorov speaks about the state of the
object. The states of the object are given in some contexts, which may contain
either the name of the object in the appropriate form, or some of its abstraction,
which allows the substitution in its place of this name (or some other) of the object
in the appropriate form (forms). In fact, that is the contexts of the said kind
that serve as determinants of states and therefore may in some way be identified
with them. That is why below we discuss only the forms of nouns that serve as
names of the relevant items, the contexts in which they can operate, and some
relationships between these contexts. We, therefore, still keeping the concept of
«state of the object» without the interpretation will continue to try to operate only
with states of these forms, suggesting that they are a result of a perceptual-sensory
and language-thinking processes (outlined below in «The picture of the world of
language and its conceptual representation»), which has led to the formation of
the psychophysical states of the language-thinking apparatus so that the forms
themselves are observable components of the state, and the complete state of the
word is a certain conceptual abstraction of sum of all the reasonable contexts.
This implies that (so far implicitly) the existence of a correspondence between
a word and its state: s : s → s(x) is postulated where x — a certain word;
s — correspondence between x and s(x), s(x) — an object representing the state
of the word x, the determinants of which are elements of the material means for
expressing semantics (both grammatical and lexical). Thus, s(x) expresses the full
state of the word in some context. So, this state includes its grammatical part,
including the one responsible for displaying partial grammatical categories of the
word x, and its case among them. Thus, the value of s(x) is a function of the
class X of words of the corresponding language. The word x ∈ X hereafter (unless
stated otherwise) is interpreted by us as a set of all conceivable forms of the word
in the language. Thus, the word x is, in fact, the set of all of its forms in all the
grammatical meanings: x = {x1, x2, . . .}, i.e. partial forms of the word are denoted
with superscripts. There are also states of more a general form that meet a certain
subclass of X. When substituting words from this division into a generalized state,
we get logically, a state of the chosen word.
Two states are called equivalent in respect of the appropriate object, if
the terms of these states of the object in the language in both cases are
used in one and the same form. For example, two states, the first of
which is that the given object is boiling, and the second is that the cat is
drinking this object are equivalent in respect of the object of «молоко».
These states are not equivalent on the object of «вода», since «вода
кипит» but «кошка пьёт воду». We say that two states are completely
equivalent if they are equivalent in respect of any object that may be in
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these states. For example, two states, the first of which is that the
cat likes the given object, and the second is that the dog is drinking
this object are equivalent in respect of any object that may be in these
states, and therefore, are completely equivalent. The set of all classes
are divided into sub-classes that do not overlap, so that any two states
of the same class are completely equivalent, and any two states from
different classes are not completely equivalent.
Comment 2. Thus, A. N. Kolmogorov offered to call these classes as «cases». It is
a natural desire of Kolmogorov as a mathematician to establish some equivalence
on the set of objects under consideration (in this specification — on the set of
states of appropriate words), since the basic property of the equivalence relation is
a partition of the set the relation operates on into an association of mutually disjoint
subsets (equivalence classes), their elements being homogeneous in respect of certain
relations what simplifies the picture considerably. Having certain linguistic skills
(says the author) the indicated equivalence can be arranged so neatly that only
states of nouns in a particular case — the traditional linguistic sense of the term
«case» — prove to be the elements of each class. Then each equivalence class can
be assigned to a certain name, which, in turn, can be identified with the name of
the case and, thus, we get a desired formal definition of this grammatical category.
However, (notes V. A. Uspensky further) unfortunately, this definition
is not entirely correct. The fact is that the same state for one and
the same object can be expressed through a variety of sentences, and
the name of the object can be in various forms. For example, Rus-
sian «мальчик идёт по берегу» «boy is walking on the shore» and
«мальчик идёт берегом» («boy is walking shore»), «рабочий строит
дом» («a worker is building a house») and «дом строится рабочим»
(«a house is being built by a worker»). Consequently, the definition of
equivalence in respect of the subject ceases to be clear. (One of the pos-
sible ways to resolve this ambiguity is to regard two states with different
linguistic expressions, as different states, since different sentences differ
always — at least slightly — in content).
§2
Exchange of views on the definition of case that took place in the work-
shop and its sidelines (meaning, in particular, the ideas expressed by
R. L. Dobrushin and I. A. Melchuk), suggests the possibility of such
a path.
The final orderly line which has either a word or three dots in every
place, three dots occurring only once, is to be called a «set of words with
a space» (shortly — merely a «set»).
For example,
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1. . . . . . . кипит
2. кошка пьёт . . . . . .
3. кошке пьёт . . . . . .
4. кошка любит . . . . . .
5. . . . . . . пьёт молоко
are five different sets of words with a space. When substituting a word
(in some form) into a set of words with a space instead of the three dots
you can get a correct sentence. For example, when substituted in the
second and fourth of the above, the word «вода» in the form of «воду»
correct sentences «кошка пьёт воду» and «кошка любит воду» ap-
pear, with the same substitution in the third set we get «кошке пьёт
воду», which is not a correct sentence. The word that being substituted
in some of its forms in a matching set, turns this set into a correct
sentence is called admissible for that set. Set for which there is at least
one admissible word, is also called admissible. Note that we do not deal
with this question of what is «correct sentence» or whether it is, for
example, the expression of some actual circumstance or merely a set of
words combined according to some fixed grammatical rules (depending
on the choice of a particular point of view the result of the substitution
of the form «воду» in the fifth example is or is not a true sentence).
Two sets are called equivalent in respect of the corresponding noun ad-
missible for each of them, if the substitution of the same form of the
noun turns both sets into correct sentences. For example, the first and
the second sets of the prescription above are equivalent in respect of the
noun «молоко», because, in order to transform these sets into a correct
sentence we should substitute the considered noun in each of them in
the same form of «молоко», and at the same time these same sets are
not equivalent in respect of the noun «вода», since the form «вода» is
to be substituted into the first of them, and the second and the form
«воду» into the second. Sets «мальчик идёт . . . . . . » and «мальчик
идёт по . . . . . . » are not equivalent in respect of the noun «берег» and
sets «. . . . . . строит дом» and «дом строится . . . . . . » are not equiv-
alent in respect of the noun «рабочий». We call, then, two sets directly
equivalent if for them there exists at least one common admissible word
and they are equivalent in respect of any word admissible for each of
them. For example, set «. . . . . . бежала» and «. . . . . . бежит» are di-
rectly equivalent sets. Finally, we say two sets P and Q are completely
equivalent if there exists a chain of sets X1, X2, . . . , Xn, that:
1) for each i sets Xi and Xi+1 are directly equivalent;
2) X1 = P ;
3) Xn = Q.
For example, «. . . . . . бежала» and «. . . . . . бежал» are completely
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equivalent sets as the corresponding chain consists of the sets «. . . . . . бе-
жала», «. . . . . . бежит», «. . . . . . бежал».
The set of all admissible sets of words with a space is partitioned into
classes that do not overlap, so that any two sets of the same class are
completely equivalent, and any two sets of different classes are not com-
pletely equivalent. You can offer to call these classes as cases.
Comment 3. The author notes that there may be situations (even with identical
states of words) when their forms are not the same. It means that the fact of
s1(x) = s2(x) still does not imply the form’s concurrence in the states 1 and 2.
Therefore, it is necessary to first clarify the Kolmogorov’s equivalence. In particular,
the author does not directly use here the term «state of the object», but makes
a fundamental step to consider a sum of contexts with one free word — namely,
to review «sets with a space», which we henceforth also call «contexts with one
(marked) variable word» or «context with one variable», or «context». Here a future
relationship between the sum of contexts of a word and its grammatical state is
noticed not quite obviously yet but clearly enough as we see it. It is, in fact,
the recognition that some states are not sufficient to determine the grammatical
features, such as case. Hence, some additional structures, such as sets of strings
with spaces are required. Now we note the properties of reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity of certain sets of strings as useful for further consideration, since they
allow us to introduce a relationship of complete equivalence. However, this step
does not remove all the difficulties what necessitates further clarification.
As the V. A. Uspensky notes the sets
«я вижу синий. . . » and «синий ... стоит» are directly equivalent
and therefore completely equivalent, although we are dealing here with
different cases. To avoid such incidents, we suggest (as if not the best,
but the easiest way out) to prohibit the use of sets of adjectives, ordinal
numbers, etc. (This prohibition extends to the next paragraph).
There remain however, difficulties of the same nature as in the previ-
ous paragraph. The same set can be converted to a correct sentence by
using the substitutions of different forms of the same noun. For exam-
ple, «не читал газеты» and «не читал газету»; «дал кошке» and
«дал кошку». Therefore, the definition of equivalence in respect of the
appropriate noun turns to be unclear. (To resolve this ambiguity we
should possibly consider only rather extensive sentences. Another way
out is to consider only those sets that can be converted into a sentence
by substitution of not more than one form of the same noun.).
§3
The combination of the views expressed in § 1 with those from § 2 brings
us to the following approach to defining the notion of case.
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Consider a certain state A, in which objects can be, and any set of words
with a space B. We say that a set B is coherent to the state of A, if for
any object that can be in the state A, the following statement is valid: in
order to express in the language the fact that the subject is in state A it
is enough to substitute some admissible form of the name of the object
instead of three dots in the set B. For example, if state A is that the
appropriate object is building a house, then this condition is coherent
both to the set of «. . . . . . строит дом», and the set «дом строится
. . . . . . ».
If the state A means that someone did not read the appropriate object
the set coherent with it is «не читал . . . . . . »; this example shows that
a coherent set can be turned into a sentence that expresses the underlying
state of the appropriate object also when substituted of more than one
form of the name of the subject: «не читал газету» and «не читал
газеты».
The set «дал ......» is coherent both to the state meaning that someone
gave something to this subject, and with the state meaning that someone
gave the subject to someone else. The pair (A,B), where A is a state and
B is a set of words with a space coherent to this state is called a coherent
pair. Let us call objects that can be in a state A, as admissible for the
pair (A,B).
Two coherent pairs (A1, B1), (A2, B2) are called equivalent in respect of
the appropriate object, if for any form of the name of the subject the
following two assertions are valid:
1) If the substitution of this form in the set B1 turns it into a sentence
that says that the object under consideration is in the state A1, then the
substitution of the same form in the set B2 turns it into a sentence that
says that the object under consideration is in the state A2;
2) if the substitution of this form in the set B2 turns it into a sentence
that says that the object under consideration is in the state A2, then the
substitution of the same form in the set B1 turns it into a sentence that
says that the object under consideration is in the state A1.
We say that two coherent pairs are directly equivalent if there is at least
one object admissible to them both and if they are equivalent in respect
of any admissible object to both of them. Call finally two coherent pairs
(P,Q) and (U, V ) completely equivalent if there exists a chain of coher-
ent pairs (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), ... , (Xn, Yn) which
1) for each pair (Xi, Yi) and (Xi+1, Yi+1) are directly equivalent;
2) (X1, Y1) = (P,Q);
3) (Xn, Yn) = (U, V ).
The set of all the coherent pairs is partitioned into sub-classes that do
not overlap, while any two pairs of the same class are completely equiv-
alent, and any two pairs from different classes are not completely equiv-
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alent. It is these classes that are offered to call cases. Fully aware of
inconclusiveness of the newly formulated definition of case, the author
nevertheless considers it appropriate to bring it here, at least as a ma-
terial for discussion.
Comment 4. Thus, in the above snippet, the author proposes to eliminate the
difficulties in turning to the consideration of the concept of «state of the object»
in conjunction with the construction of «a set with a space», i.e., from the context
with one (marked) variable word. The concept of coherent pairs is introduced as
«state of the object», «set with a space». Thus, at the first phase the «state»
allows to carry out a certain selection of contexts and form a set of «coherent
pairs». The introduction of relations of equivalence and direct equivalence for the
coherent pairs lets the author define the property of symmetry, and the introduction
of absolute equivalence — also the property of transitivity. Thus, the relation of
complete equivalence turns to be reflexive, symmetric and transitive — that is an
equivalence relation in the usual sense of the set theory. As such, it divides the set
of all the coherent pairs into classes that are mutually disjoint. It is those classes
that the author proposes to identify as cases.
True, there is a certain reticence. If, for example, the author notes, state A is
that the appropriate object is building a house, both the set B1 = «. . . . . . building
a house» and set B2 = «house built . . . . . . » are coherent with this state. The
dots here can be replaced by a noun in a suitable form such as «worker is building
a house» and «house is being built by the worker». It is good that states 1 and 2
deny the equivalence of pairs. But is not entirely clear what is the status of the
expression «appropriate object is building the house», which is used as a definition
of the state — in fact, due to the uncertain definition of «appropriate object», this
expression is virtually indistinguishable from the set of «. . . . . . building a house».
Nor is it entirely clear whether the different states of «relevant objects» emerge
when substituting a specific noun in this formula. Because states of nouns in first
place in the contexts of «a worker is building a house», «a foreman is building
a house», «the factory is building a house», «the State is building a house», are
hardly the same. Also, still the identity of the states «the appropriate object builds
the house» and «the house is being built by the appropriate object» is not very clear
either. In general, it is not clear which state of a worker, for example, is defined
with the expression «a worker is building a house» (the worker is laying bricks
in masonry, mixing cement, just having a smoke or like Shura from the famous
film by Leonid Gaidai running away from a bully delivered for re-education). For
comparison, consider the similar structure of the state «the object likes vodka»
and «vodka is liked by the object», «the object loves a countrywoman» and «a
countrywoman is loved by the object», «the object makes the revolution» and
«revolution is made by the object». Substituting the word «worker» in matching
sets in the due form informs a lot of details to participants of the speech process
to never clarify the point at all.
Here, however, we cannot fail to note a certain congeniality of approaches devel-
oped by Isaac Newton and A. N. Kolmogorov who both tried to bring the properties
of the language of the «nature of things». At the same time, it appears that by
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introducing the concept of «state of the object» Kolmogorov had in mind not so
states of real objects but rather a certain semantic lingual construct, the use of
which in the procedure Kolmogorov developed is instrumental in selecting forms of
words, allowing to «cut off» unacceptable, too grammatically irrelevant situations
in respect of that one given by the context under consideration. It is clear that he
was aware of some insufficiency of this definition, noting that «. . . Fully aware of
inconclusiveness of the newly formulated definition of case, the author nevertheless
considers it appropriate to bring it here, at least as a material for further discus-
sion». However, in the next paragraph he gives quite a meaningful algorithmic
scheme of definition of the noun case, which is as follows.
§4
To determine in which case the appropriate noun is in a particular
sentence, act as follows:
1. Determine the state in which there is a subject denoted by this noun;
2. Replace this noun with three dots and get the same set of words with
a space;
3. We note that the resulting pair (set, state) is coherent, and determine
which class, i.e. the case it belongs to.
To extend our construction to nouns in the plural it is enough to admit
that every such noun denotes a particular subject (other than the subject
designated by the same noun, but in the singular).
For example, the noun «glass» refers to the subject of «glass» and the
noun “glasses” refers to an object that consists of some set of glasses.
(Note that because of our agreement «профессора» and «профессоры»
(Rus. «professors» — editor’s note) are merely different names for the
same object.).
§5
The answer to the question, how many cases are in a particular lan-
guage, should be given through a particular linguistic analysis of the
language. If we proceed with the proposed definition in § 3, we find that
in the Russian language in addition to traditional six cases there are
still the following cases:
1. Local case (in Russian “местный”, as opposed to the traditional
“предложный” — author’s note) «в лесу», «в году» etc.
2. Quantitative-ablative case «выпить чаю», «прибавить ходу»,
«дать воды» and so on. If both sentences «не читал газету» and
«не читал газеты» are correct and express the same state of the ob-
ject «newspaper», it indicates that there is a special case («deprivative»),
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which is used after verbs of denial and has two forms (one of which is
identical with the accusative, and the other is a form of the genitive
case). If «не читал газету» is right, and «не читал газеты» is
wrong in the first of these sentences, we deal with the accusative. If
«не читал газету» is wrong, but «не читал газеты» is right, in the
second of these sentences we are dealing with the genitive case. If, fi-
nally, both sentences are correct, but they represent different states of
the subject «newspaper» then in the first sentence there is accusative,
and the second there is genitive.
It is possible that there are other cases. It would be interesting to enu-
merate all the cases of Russian.
Comment 5. If we ignore a number of details related to the need to attract many
useless formalization and undetectable aspects, the Kolmogorov–Uspensky scheme
can be reduced to the following.
We introduce the set K(X) of contexts of a single variable x, where x ranges
over the class X of nouns of a certain language in which the category of case is
defined.
The notion of state s(x), x ∈ X, is introduced. It does not have, however,
a clear definition, but operates on the set K(X) in a well-defined way described
above. The result of this action is a certain selection of contexts into coherent pairs
<state-context> and the establishment of an equivalence relation which divides
K(x) into mutually disjoint subsets, i.e. equivalence classes:
N
K(X) = ∪Ki(X);Ki(X) ∩Kj(X) =  when i 6= j, (1)
i = 1
where N — number of cases in that language, so contexts kji (x) and k
r
i (y), which
belong to the class Ki(X) are equivalent in the above sense. Thus, the name of
a subset of Ki(X), i = 1, 2, ..., N , can be identified with the name of a relevant case,
and all labeled x ∈ X, belonging to the class Ki(X) are available in it only in the
forms of i−th case. It follows from this that the partial grammatical class (a part of
the overall state of s(x) related to the case properties) is an abstraction of certain
elements of Ki(X).
In this sense, the notion of Kolmogorov–Uspensky state considered in a single
complex process of constructing equivalence classes of case, appears as an operator
(call it the operator of case or the Kolmogorov–Uspensky operator and denote by
the symbol [KU]). It operates on a set of word contexts with X and breaks the
corresponding set into a number of mutually disjoint subsets. Thus, each of the
subsets contains contexts in which words from the X are found in only one case
characteristic of this subset. As noted above, each such a subset can be marked by
the symbol (name) of the case and used as the case’s definition.
However, a slightly different look is also possible. As the design and the proce-
dure described above can be applied to any new context (since K(X) is never final)
in order to determine the case of a word ξ from k(ξ), it is logical to assume that in
such a way the «case» part of its full linguistic state s(ξ) is defined, and the value
On the Phenomenological Approach to Grammar 19
of the word case acquires the status of an eigenvalue of the operator [KU]. Thus,
we could argue that in the considered context, the word ξ is in a linguistic state
with a certain value of case, and the mentioned linguistic state plays a role of its
own state of the Kolmogorov–Uspensky operator. There are, of course, contexts
of uncertain value (the classic example is «день преодолевает ночь», a Russian
ambiguous phrase meaning «day overcomes night» and «day is being overcome by
night»); to describe them one uses the procedure of state superposition which is
discussed in the next section.
According to the logic of our presentation, the value of case received by the
Kolmogorov–Uspensky procedure («eigenvalues» of the operator [KU]), play a role
as observed values of the theory, and the «eigenfunctions» of the operator can be
regarded as partial grammatical states that identify the case status of the corre-
sponding words. As a result, in this case we are able to formalize the problem as an
eigenvalue problem (typical of mathematical physics). The fact that we are dealing
with mathematically undefined objects should not embarrass us, since this situa-
tion is typical of theories with formally (topologically and algebraically) uncertain
baseline parameterization of its objects — and such are mainly linguistic theories.
It should be noted that the formal definition of the observed values is rather
a complicated procedure for any theory that works with real objects, and that
the Kolmogorov did manage almost 60 years ago to advance so far in the formal
definition of a very difficult grammatical concept, inspires deep respect. We note
occasionally that Andrei Nikolayevich may have not set out as a special goal to
define the concept of state of a linguistic unit — the object is subsidiary for him
and, so to speak, of a technical nature. However, this very proposal (i.e., putting
in accordance of the linguistic state to a language unit) is, in our opinion, the most
fundamental and valuable in his work. Indeed, the concept of case (as well as other
categories of language) will still be refined and specified continuously when further
exploring the properties of the linguistic substance, while the proposals concerning
a fundamentally new base for the conceptual description of the phenomenology of
language (and that is the approach of linguistic states), appear much more seldom.
Here, as we see it, it is just the case.
Unfortunately, these ideas remained practically unnoticed and unused by the
linguistic community. In particular, we do not know any works that would attempt
to extend the above methodology to determine other grammatical categories and
other parts of speech (including the determination of the parts of speech them-
selves). A. A. Zalizniak alone perceived the Kolmogorov–Uspensky ideology and
used it in his excellent book «The Russian nominal inflection» (hereinafter abbre-
viated use RNI), published in 1967 (Zalizniak, 1967). The reprint of this book
in 2002 also contains several other works by A. A. Zalizniak, including the article
«On the understanding of the term «case» in linguistic descriptions», first pub-
lished in the book «Problems of grammatical modeling» (Zalizniak, 1973), where
the author develops the concept of case system, indicating, in particular, the place
the Kolmogorov–Uspensky approach occupies in it. Here are some snippets of this
article.9
9The reader easily distinguishes the Zaliznyak’s text typed in italics of our comments to it.
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A. A. Zalizniak notes
that two different understanding of the term «case» that can be (some-
what arbitrarily) designated as «semantic» and «formal». The main
difference between them is whether there is allowed the existence of two
different cases without a difference between them that can be expressed
outwardly. Under the semantic understanding of the case the answer
is positive, under the formal one it is negative. The particular case in
semantic understanding is a certain element of meaning, namely, a cer-
tain semantic relation, for example, «to be the subject of action», «be
an instrument of action», «belong to someone (something)», «be inside
of something». Cases in the semantic sense can somehow be expressed
in any language, so if considered without regard to the mode of expres-
sion, they act as an element of a universal system of meaning units.
We can describe as «narrowly formal» such understanding of case, in
which whole word forms alone are allowed as case forms and two cases
are regarded as different only if at least a part of the conjugated words
they correspond to have different external forms.
The specific case in the narrow formal sense (for nouns) can be described
in the first approximation as follows: it is a set of word forms (or, to
say, something that all the word forms of the set have in common), each
of which is capable of expressing one or more of cases in the semantic
sense in addition to its core, objective meaning.
For example, in Russian ablative meets a number of word forms, in-
cluding, among many others, the word-forms «пером», «человеком»,
«стрелой», «лесом», «мыслью», «перьями», «детьми» and so on.
Each of them is able to express a series of cases in the semantic sense
(meaning of an instrument, doer, reference standard, traffic areas, etc.,
cf. above). Thus, the cases in the narrowly formal sense that is one of
possible means (along with prepositions, postpositions, word order, etc.)
to express the cases in the semantic sense.
Note: Here A. A. Zalizniak believes that the semantic understanding of case
provides finer gradations within the semantic structure inside its proposed narrowly
formal interpretation and, thus, the semantic understanding «splits» the narrowly
formal level (the actual «case») into some «sublevels». This interpretation is sup-
ported with the following remark in footnote 2, p. 616 of the Russian edition of
RNI, which states: «the relation between cases in narrowly formal and semantic un-
derstanding is clearly demonstrated in the titles traditional for the Latin grammars:
genetivus possessivus, genetivus partitivus, genetivus subjectivus, genetivus objec-
tivus, dativus commodi, dativus possessivus, dativus finalis etc.: here the first part
of the name corresponds to the case in the narrowly formal sense, and the second
— in case in the semantic sense.». Thus, within the «narrow formal», for example,
genetivus as many as four «semantic» cases are contained: genetivus possessivus,
genetivus partitivus, genetivus subjectivus, genetivus objectivus.
In recognition of cases (in the narrow formal sense) in a particular language
there must be at least two of them, otherwise it is said in that language there is
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no cases at all. Obviously, says A. A. Zalizniak, that the cases in the formal (and
in particular, the narrowly formal) sense are not of a universal character, and
always make an element of the grammatical structure of a particular language: one
language, for example, has 6 cases (in the formal sense), in another there are 15,
in the third they do not exist. And later, in modern linguistic literature, especially
in specific descriptions the narrow formal understanding of case certainly prevails,
and that is what will be of interest to us below. Accordingly, in the cited papers
A. A. Zalizniak considers only such descriptions of case systems that are based
explicitly or implicitly on a formal description of the narrow case. Later under the
«case» (without qualification) the author means a case in the narrowly formal sense.
On the same page in footnote 4 A. A. Zalizniak notes that case in the semantic
sense corresponds to the notion of «semantic role» he introduces below. And we
note that statement because subsequently we have to understand the relationship
of such concepts as the case in the semantic sense, the (semantic) state and the
semantic role.
With regard to this last remark we will do one more clarification. A. A. Za-
lizniak further on in his article again emphasizes that he uses a vague notion of
«semantic» role that matches in its content to what was above named case in the
semantic sense. This concept is related to the usage specified below. Let the phrase
«Он послал родителям книгу своего друга.» (Rus. «He sent his friend’s book
to his parents» — editor’s note). We say that the segment of «родителям» ex-
presses in this phrase a semantic role of «recipient of action» for the nominateme
«родители»; segment «книгу» in this phrase expresses the semantic role of «ob-
ject of action» for the nominateme «книга», the segment «друга» may express in
this sentence the semantic role of «owner of something» or the semantic role «au-
thor of something» for the nominateme «друг». Semantic roles can be expressed
by segments not only in phrases, but also collocations. For example, in the col-
location «послать родителям книгу своего друга» the segments «родителям»,
«книгу», «друга» of the same semantic roles (for appropriate nominatemes) as
in the phrase analyzed above. In footnote 14 on page 623, A. A. Zalizniak notes
that the term «context» corresponds to the term «set of words with a space» in
the V. A. Uspensky’s paper from 1957, the term «semantic role» to the «state»,
the term «situation» to the term «coherent pair» (we also refer to the RNI, § 2.3).
Thus, the above three concepts, namely the case in the semantic understanding, the
(semantic) condition and the semantic role in the author’s interpretations appear
identical (at least within the problem under consideration).
Next, A. A. Zalizniak develops his theory of case, which, in our opinion, is an
updated and detailed version of the Kolmogorov–Uspensky approach. We will not
dwell here on the details of the presentation, because we intend to focus on the
case in terms of semantic understanding, the (semantic) condition and the seman-
tic role. In A. A. Zalizniak’s paper, as already mentioned, they are regarded as
identical, although, generally speaking, are different. Thus, by the very sense of
the notion of «case» it looks like the number of cases in the semantic sense should
be small and (be still better), they should be named (listed), at least in the very
rough approximation. In Latin, the author gives the list — (genetivus): posses-
sivus, partitivus, subjectivus, objectivus, (dativus): commodi, possessivus, finalis,
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..., but without specifying whether it is complete and versatile. It is not clear ei-
ther in what accordance are semantic roles to the list of cases in the semantic sense.
And even more uncertain seems to match these two concepts to the concept of the
state according to A. N. Kolmogorov. However, judging from the A. A. Zalizniak’s
description of the procedure to establish the case system this procedure, except for
some details, follows the above procedure by Kolmogorov–Uspensky. So this com-
mon, unified procedure could easily be named as Kolmogorov–Uspensky–Zalizniak,
setting the line not only between the procedures applicable in both concepts, but
also between the relevant parts of the algorithm. At least for today in terms of
function the use of all the three above basic concepts is quite identical, despite
their possible conceptual differences and uncertainties in their definitions.
The above uncertainties, we think, may be allowed under a slightly different
conceptual paradigm with states of linguistic units, corresponding grammatical
observed values, as well as procedures that bind together the linguistic states and
linguistic observables to make the paradigm’s core. Namely, if we follow the general
concept of linguistic states, the categories of case should match a certain operator
acting in the space of grammatical states so that its eigenvalues are the values
of specific cases. Actually, that is the Kolmogorov–Uspensky–Zalizniak procedure
that acts as a grammatical operator of the case. That the state by Kolmogorov
is involved in its definition should not be confusing, since the notion of space of
linguistic states is still, unfortunately, far from a mathematical formalization and
we have to be content with its purely symbolic representation. So, components
of the linguistic state actually guessed can be nevertheless quite legitimately used
in the process of determining the eigenvalues of the case operator, considering the
approach to be specific and characteristic of the method to be formulated.
In this picture it is necessary to bear in mind some other effects that occur
in theories that work with observables formalized as the eigenvalues of the corre-
sponding operators in the relevant state space.
First, it is the invariance of subspace of states corresponding to a particular
eigenvalue. Here it meets the equivalence class of case identified by the Kolmogorov–
Uspensky–Zalizniak procedure on a set of coherent pairs (situations).
Secondly, it is the so-called effect of the fine structure10 when the level cor-
responding to a particular eigenvalue being split to some «sublevels» with the
inclusion of an additional «semantic interaction» or, equivalently, considering the
semantic factors not taken into account earlier. For instance, the value of Latin
cases given by A. A. Zalizniak <genetivus>; <dativus>; ... are interpreted as
«eigenvalues» of the operator of «the narrowly formal case», while <genetivus
possessivus>, <genetivus partitivus>, <genetivus subjectivus>, <genetivus ob-
jectivus> .... are the eigenvalues of the operator of «the semantic case», which
includes some additional data in comparison with «narrowly formal» aspects of the
grammatical meaning. The «narrowly formal case» presents a «degenerate» level,
and this «degeneracy» is removed when taking into account more a subtle seman-
tic factor defined by a «semantic case» and the original case state is split, showing
a «subtle semantic structure» that on the above A. A. Zalizniak’s example can be
10Fine structure of quantum mechanics.
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schematically shown in Latin as follows (see Fig. 3):
Figure 3: «Fine semantic structure» of the Latin case (genetivus)
Similar comments can be made on the concept of semantic role, which, given
generally, should serve (and it does in the above case) rather as a part of the pro-
cedure (operator) of the case system than as its state. In this sense, the meaning of
the grammatical category of case both in its narrowly formal and semantic under-
standing play the role of eigenvalues of the corresponding grammatical operators
that operate on the set of grammatical states of words. It should therefore be
considered that the note expressed by V. A. Plungian in his very detailed book
(Plungian, 2011, p. 183, footnote 69) saying that the «semantic role» is analogous
to a «more impressionistic» concept of the «state» still does not match the ac-
tual situation, namely, the «semantic role» is in no way a «state», but plays (as
a part of the Zalizniak procedure) the role of an operator with the states as its
own functions, and specific (and manifested in contexts) values of the case as its
eigenvalues. And the fact that the semantic role is involved in the definition of
case, looks almost trivial due to the fact that the said role corresponding to case in
the semantic sense, already is, so to say, «inside» of the fine structure of case and
detected in the context of case in the semantic sense, as it follows from the scheme
shown in Fig. 4.
It brings us very closely to the definition of case class of equivalence on the set
of coherent pairs (situations), and therefore to the definition of case in the narrowly
formal sense.
Thus, in the Kolmogorov’s theory (and therefore in the Zalizniak procedure) the
states should occupy a place as indicated in the following diagram below (Fig. 5).
The employment of the concept of the state of language unit was further devel-
oped in our works and the works of our fellows (Potapova, 2012; Shyrokov, 1999,
2004, 2005, 2009, 2012). According to them any word (to say generally — any
language unit) in the context or in the speech flow is in a certain semantic state.
For units of the lexical level the state is in some way a sum of signs of grammatical
and lexical semantics somehow arranged and provides a way to summarize the con-
cepts of grammatical and lexical meaning, which is to be the topic of our further
narrative.
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Figure 4: States in the picture by Kolmogorov–Uspensky–Zalizniak.
Further formalization of linguistic states
The process of language understanding can be presented as a reduction of the
a priori distribution of lexemes by gross signs of grammatical and lexical semantics
inherent in the subjective lexicon of the recipient to a certain grammatical and
lexical meaning specific to that very context, which is in the field of attention of
the recipient and subject in this point to the process of his individual language
processing. Thus, the above scheme can be generalized and detailed as follows (see
Fig. 5):
Although a formal apparatus for determination of all possible states of any
lexemes (more generally — of any unit of language) has not yet been created it is
naturally to assume that a set of grammatical and lexical meanings as presented, for
example, in a large explanatory dictionary of a language can serve as a sufficiently
adequate model of such a system. In general, we intend to use the concept of
the system state (we consider every unit of language as a system and at the same
time a part of a higher-level system), within the paradigm of modern science and
technology (Boum, 1990; Landau & Lifshits, 1989). Thus, when considering the
formal aspects of semantics we shall proceed with the existence of a correspondence
between the language unit and its state:
s : X → s(X) (2)
where X — is a certain language unit; s— correspondence between X and s(X) —
a formal object that represents the state of the unit X with elements of the material
means for expressing the semantics as its determinants as indicated in the diagram
above. For every unit X its states form a certain set (for simplicity we consider it
to be finite but unlimited, although this is not essential) — usually denoted by the
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Figure 5: Extended scheme of states of linguistic units.
symbol as {s(X)}. Class of units of a certain type in the language L is denoted by
the symbol W (L) or simply W , if only one specific language is meant, belonging of
X to the class W is denoted by: X ∈ W ; set of all states for all x ∈ W is denoted
by S ≡ {s(X), X ∈W}.
Suppose that there exists an operator F , the effect of which is defined on the
set of semantic classes S and which we interpret as a value operator of a certain
semantic category (they may be also categories of grammatical semantics as in the
example analyzed in the previous paragraph. If, for example, F is the operator of
the language, then its values are: f1 — «noun», f2 — «verb», f3 — «adjective»
etc.). This means that F is a kind of intelligent mechanism that analyzing the
state of X, namely s(X), identifies the value of a particular semantic category that
precisely matches this very state. It is clear that the definition of operators of type
F must be based on some semantic theory formalized properly.
Thus, when considering the formal aspects of the semantics we proceed with
the existence of a correspondence between linguistic unit and its state. Using the
mathematical language the action of the operator F can be expressed as following:
Fsi(X) = fisi(X) (3)
where fi — specific value of semantic categories, functions si(X), i = 1, 2, . . .,
represents the states of the unit X that mark its affiliation with the values of fi
of the category F . The values of fi, i = 1, 2, . . ., are called the eigenvalues of the
operator F , that correspond to states si(X), i = 1, 2, . . .. The set of all states that
correspond to the eigenvalues fi, are called the set of partial semantic classes and
marked by the symbol S(fi):
S(fi) := {s : Fs = fisi} (4)
By definition of sets S(fi) consists only of those semantic classes characterized
by a definite value of the semantic category F , — namely, the value of fi.
Equation (3) in cases where the set ranging over the index i consists of more
than one element is a formal expression of the phenomenon of semantic ambiguity.
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For units of the lexical level this is polysemy and homonymy (both lexical and
grammatical). In particular, in the case of homonymy this reflects a situation
where the word form X in one context may be, for instance, in the state of a noun,
and in another — in the state, for example, of a verb. This type is usually called
inter-part-of-speech homonymy.
Situations are possible when in the equation (3) there is not one semantic condi-
tion si(X) but several that correspond to a value of fi : s
j
i (X), j = 1, 2, . . .. We call
such states as degenerate, the presence of degeneracy is signaled by the superscript
character in the semantic state sji (X). For example, in the Ukrainian language
the word form “мати” when getting the value of «noun» of the category «part of
speech» has two grammatical states g (мати):
g
feminine singular, nominative.
noun ,
where the word «мати» has a lexical meaning «woman in relation to the child that
she gave birth» and:
g
masculine plural, nominative.
noun ,
where the word «мати» has a lexical meaning “sport mattresses.” This example
illustrates the phenomenon of homonymy inside the same part of speech.
We designate the number of own semantic states X corresponding to a value
of the category F as multiplicity of degeneracy of the semantic state. Thus, in
the above example, the state g (мати) has a multiplicity of degeneracy that equals
to 2. Semantic states in which the operator F has one value only, is called net.
However, a priori it is impossible to forbid the existence of semantic states for
which the operator F acquires more than one value. Formally, this situation can
be represented by means of the relation:
F (X) = f1α1(s1)s1(X) + f2α2(s2)s2(X), (5)
where s— semantic state of the linguistic unitX when exposed to it by the operator
F is split into two, namely: s1(X) and s2(X), where s1(X) corresponds to values of
semantic categories f1, and s2(X) to values of semantic categories f2; the linguistic
sense of the functions α1(s1) and α2(s2) is explained below.
States for which the operator F , acting on the function of semantic state is
a combination of a certain number of net semantic states corresponding to differ-
ent eigenvalues of this operator are called semantic mixed states. Thus, equation
(5) defines the semantic state in which the unit X is and which is a peculiar phe-
nomenon of superposition («mixture») of net semantic classes s1(X) and s2(X)
corresponding to the eigenvalues f1 and f2, respectively. Linguistic interpretation
of equation (5) is that the linguistic unit X has the semantic features of both f1
and f2. Corresponding figures, the identifiers of the specified belonging are located
in the expressions for semantic states s1(X) and s2(X).
This situation is quite typical for the language. For example, Ukrainian and
Russian participles contain the properties of the verb and the adjective. Consider,
for example, the Russian participle lexems «ведущий» (leading) and «ведомый»
(driven). They decline according to the adjective inflectional paradigm (six cases
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in the masculine, feminine and neutral gender of singular and in plural), having
besides in its structure a verbal morphological feature of active or passive voice
— it is materially expressed by the suffix -ущ- and -ом-, respectively. The above
morphological character does not look strong in terms of belonging to the verb,
since in the verbal paradigm it is not inflectional. In addition, it is typical for
the full inflectional paradigm, not only for its individual members. This provides
a basis for distinguishing a class of words with such properties as an independent
part of speech — «participle». The Ukrainian title for the term «дiєприкметник»
(participle) reflects both features — those of the verb and the adjective.11
Notes on the concept of state and phenomenological complexity of the
structure of the world
In this article we do not intend to consider a lot of examples that illustrate the
capabilities of the formalism of states of linguistic units. Several applications of this
formalism have been demonstrated in other works cited above. The purpose of this
paper is to show a phenomenological character of grammar of natural language and
hence the proximity of the science of language to other disciplines of science, and
also those of the technological circle. We experience the urgency of this problem
in connection with the linguistic load falling on the knowledge engineering that
takes on features of a global industrial sector and requires ever more sophisticated
intelligent linguistic tools for its development.
In connection with the above we consider it necessary to give some general sci-
entific discourse on the concept of state. This concept is used in many natural,
sociological and technical disciplines. We believe it most deeply developed theoret-
ically and practically in quantum mechanics where it is a fundamental.
According to the canonical doctrine of quantum mechanics, any system at
a given time is in a particular state. The system status is formalized as a solu-
tion of the Schrödinger equation for that system. Since the Schrödinger equation
is differential equation of a certain type in partial derivatives the set of its solu-
tions identified with the states of the system under consideration forms an infinite-
dimension Hilbert space. Thus, the number of states of a quantum mechanical
system is theoretically infinite. System status is in theory its most complete de-
scription and defines a probabilistic interpretation of the system’s behavior, but
by itself it is, generally speaking, is not directly observable. Observed values are
represented in quantum mechanics by Hermitian operators acting in a Hilbert space
of states, and the possible values of the observed quantities are expressed through
the matrix elements of the operators in the space of states. However in other the-
ories the states of a system can be observable. For example, in classical mechanics
the state of a material point is defined as a coordinate-momentum pair at a time
(x(t), y(t)), and they are observable, both separately and together. In quantum
mechanics there is however a fundamental restriction on the simultaneous mea-
surement of position and momentum, which is given by the Heisenberg uncertainty
correlation.
11An example of superposition of grammatical classes in Turkish language is given in the book
by (K. V. Shyrokov, 2009). It demonstrates that some inflectional paradigm of the Turkish noun
has certain categorical and material features of the verb.
28 Volodymyr Shyrokov & Ihor Shevchenko
Thus, the concept and the status of observable values are not invariant and
are defined diversely in different natural (and other) theories. This adds some
spice to the use of the notion of state, for instance in the theory of calculus,
which in its present form, in our opinion, ignores the phenomenon of observability–
unobservability.12
One would demand that the theory operate with observables only, but this issue
is not simple. It was widely debated at the time of the formation of the quantum
theory and has not lost relevance in our time. Theoretical knowledge achieved in
the domain contains methodological lessons and principles so general that they may
and should be used in any science that has ambitions of theoretical understanding
of nature of the things it studies.
The first and foremost is probably the fact that for the characterization of states
of objects both observable and directly unobservable quantities are actually used.
Moreover, in the opinion of most scholars to build a theory with observables alone
is impossible (recall the Einstein’s statement on the matter). But it is clear that
without observables a scientific theory or science in general is basically unthinkable.
Quantities observable and directly unobservable must have different logical and
ontological status, but, as far as we know, the general theory of this issue is not
developed yet in detail.
In light of this interpretation a relationship between the values observable and
directly unobservable in a theory is suggested: they are, respectively, «formal» and
«substantive» aspects of the object under observation (in the terminology of the
theory of lexicographic systems (L-systems)13 register and interpretative parts of
some hypothetical L-systems developed as a result of the manifestation of a lexico-
graphical effect). When applied to objects such as language the interpretation can
be detailed in the sense that any linguistic unit has a «two-way» nature and its state
admits a decomposition to a formal component (accessible for direct perception by
the subject — whether it be a sound or a picture image), while the substantive com-
ponent is represented by a set of «all the contexts» in which such a linguistic unit
can operate when in the proper state — this, in fact, makes the specified part of the
given state unobservable. A scientific debate about the logical and psychological
principles of the phenomenon of observability should mention such a philosophical
setting as the Mach principle, according to which sensory impressions are arranged
in human thought in a manner that provides the most economical layout of these
experiences into stable complexes.
Characteristically, A. Einstein believing this principle to be too trivial for acting
as a universal epistemological law noted the special role of language in ontologo-
logical and psychological evolution of the process of cognition (Heisenberg, 2007).
He considered the language constructs to be not only a way of fixing sensible com-
plexes, but also reflecting the reality that exists (or just can exist) outside of these
12However, due to the quantum generalizations of formal structures, such as Petri nets
(Abramsky, 2008) or neuronic nets (Lagaris, Likas, & Fotiadis, 1997) concept of observability–
unobservability is likely to be introduced into the theory of objects used to describe information
technology processes and systems.
13The most comprehensive to date lexicographical presentation of the theory of systems and its
applications is given in the book “Computer lexicography” (Shyrokov, 2011).
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complexes and not bound to them — recall in this connection the Newtonian «na-
ture of things». We believe that Einstein’s observations on the role of language
(note, he was extremely sensitive to the issues of the philosophy of knowledge) are
not casual at all — they emphasize the idea of the universality of information and
cultural processes at all levels of knowledge of reality.
Further notes concern the discussion of the criteria of simplicity of the scientific
theory — it is not necessarily associated with the Mach principle. The simplicity of
a scientific theory is for most researchers rather a question of aesthetics — simplic-
ity and beauty of mathematical schemes, prompted by the nature, make them more
convincing. Note that in the era when the quantum theory was formulated the no-
tion of simplicity (and the antonymous, and hence related, concept of complexity)
belonged to the common language, because then there was no formulated theory
of complexity — it is known to have emerged thanks to the works by A. N. Kol-
mogorov only in the 1950s (see: Kolmogorov, 1968, 1987 and references in this
book). Nor was then clarified the communication of complexity of the objects and
their descriptions (and therefore — their simplicity!) with the concept of informa-
tion. Quantitative measures to assess these variables and the relationships between
them were also unknown. So, the mentioned above notion of complexity devel-
oped by Kolmogorov and other scientists, its connection with information aspects
of the description of reality and the concept of information and its quantitative
characteristics, are deeply connected to the criteria of simplicity and beauty of the
scientific theory. Minimality of description of an object under research, which is
according to A. N. Kolmogorov is an objective measure of the amount of informa-
tion about the object, encourages scientists (at least as a subconscious incentive)
to find a description of this very type, although it does not specify ways or gives
recipes, because, to say generally, it belongs to the class of algorithmically unsolv-
able problems. However, the lack of ways and recipes does not deny the objective
existence of a minimum description — it only proves the nonexistence of a formula
or an algorithm to generate new scientific truths. And if such a description is found,
it obviously has to look as simple as possible — in essence, it is really so. Thus,
the criterion of simplicity (or beauty) of the scientific theory, in our opinion, is not
so much a consequence of the principle of economy of thought (which A. Einstein
describes as «suspiciously commercial» and that, in fact, is only very indirectly re-
lated to the matter, because it is rather about a fundamental information property
of objectively existing things than the property of thinking as a subjective process),
as follows from the general nature of information, and corresponds to the formal
definition of measure of its quantity by A. N. Kolmogorov.
Indeed, when a description of the investigated object (process, system, etc.) that
most appropriately meets its essence is obtained, this description should be mini-
mal, since it offers only essential information about the object and does not contain
descriptions of casual, minor details that «clutter» the significant with «unneces-
sary» items. The scientist, so to speak, instinctively seeks just such a description
of an object, which is consistent with the Kolmogorov’s definition of information
measure based on the minimal description. This, in our opinion, explains the
psychological confidence the researcher feels when he succeeds in getting a simple
(beautiful!) formula, equation, conclusion, etc.
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The formalism of the theory of complexity is both clear and deep. It should
be taken as an ontologically objective property of things. One of the non-trivial
manifestations of the above feature is that the complexity of the composite forma-
tion, in general, is not equal to the sum of the complexities of entities that form it.
To put it more precisely, the complexity is not an additive function of the system.
In other words, if there is any system that includes other «smaller» sub-systems,
which are its constituents, i.e. if:
D = ∪Di (6)
i
where the symbol D indicates the proposed system, and Di — its components,
then:
K(D) 6= ΣK(Di), (7)
i
where K(D) is a quantitative measure of the complexity of D, and K(Di), re-
spectively, quantitative measures of the complexity of its constituents Di (usually
K(Di) < ΣK(Di)). These ideas, of course, apply to some K(Di), as well as their
components.
In the process of formation, functioning and interaction of composite systems
a phenomenon takes place that we qualify as a «self-compensation of complexity».
The content of this phenomenon reduces to the following. The nature of the in-
teraction between constituents that form a unity (a wholeness), which is identified
as a composite object is such that in a «bound» state they exhibit only a portion
of their total «inherent» complexity. The necessity of such behavior can be in-
terpreted as providing a fundamental possibility of knowledge of the «manifested»
being, and perhaps even its very existence. Otherwise, the complexity of any ob-
ject would be actually infinite (potentially it is), while in our case the complexities
of individual components look like compensating each other in the formation of
the whole. So one could argue that the potential complexity of any thing is infi-
nite, because now we do not see the boundaries of the divisibility of matter and
each lower structural level has a non-zero complexity. But the kinds of component
complexity do not manifest all at once but only «level by level». Therefore, the
complexity in each case undergoes to «renormalization» if you take an analogy
with quantum electrodynamics, where for the elimination of differences you also
have to apply the procedure of «subtracting the infinities». That is the language
that gives us a prime example of self-compensation of complexity. For example,
we can regard the length of a particular dictionary entry, which takes into account
the effects of grammatical and lexical semantics including the multiplicity of gram-
matical meanings, the lexical polysemy, the phraseological structure of lexemes and
so on as a degree of complexity of the corresponding word. Meanwhile, the word
in a sentence (a specific context) operates only in a certain sense — one meaning
or a kind of «mixture» of several possible meanings for polysemical lexemes and
therefore the measure of its complexity in a particular context is determined by
only a part of the dictionary entry, and in some cases it may be only a few tenths
or even hundredths of the full complexity of the lexeme. Thus, the complexity of
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a sentence may prove to be less than the full complexity of a single word which is
an integral part of the former.
The design of the being proves to be paradoxical! It turns out that complex
things are actually made up of even more complex ones. In this sense, «more» is
less than «less». In our opinion, the well-known effect that has both ontological
and psychological dimensions is a nontrivial proof of this thesis — it relates to the
complexity of scientific theories: the theory of atoms, for example, does not look
simpler than the theory of molecules, theory of nuclei does not seem simpler than
the atomic theory, theory of elementary particles is not simpler than the theory of
nuclei, and so on. In linguistics, for instance, the theory of words («lexicology») also
is not simpler than the theory of sentence («syntax»). In the light of the above the
principle of reductionism, according to which complex things should be composed of
simpler ones looks not only obvious, but even doubtful that leads to some revision
of the standard systems analysis, taking into account the effects described by the
complexity theory. At this level, the latter begins to acquire features and the
status of a natural-scientific and a general scientific doctrine, rather than a purely
mathematical one.
Finally, we add that our observations on the phenomenological aspects of gram-
mar convince us that the language and the science of language have far more in
common with natural phenomena and natural sciences than is assumed in conven-
tional linguistics. We would like to express our conviction that in the future this
commonality will acquire much more defined features.
Linguistic states in the formalism of fuzzy sets
We emphasize the fundamental difference between the above situation and the usual
homonymy. The phenomenon of homonymy can be described by the equation:
Fs(X) = f1α1(s1)s1(X) + f2α2(s2)s2(X) + . . ., (8)
where different members of the right-hand side correspond to different homonymic
states of the word X — if it is exposed to a particular kind of ambiguity. But
in the process of language processing, where there is a disambiguation, the right-
hand side of this equation is reduced to one member that, in fact, represents the
net grammatical status of the given word X in a particular context. A completely
different situation takes place when X is in a mixed state — then no linguistic
processing is able to reduce the number of members of equation (8), which is the
final result. This situation indicates the existence of language units that operate in
a context in multimodal semantic states.
The conclusion about the existence of units for which the language admits only
those contexts to function in mixed semantic states, looks like rather an interesting
evidence of the impossibility to formalize language system in full, rather, an evi-
dence of the limits of its formalization. This particularly means that even the most
suitable for formalization and, indeed, the most formal sector of the theory of lan-
guage, namely grammar, has features of fuzziness what is in disharmony with the
tradition of grammatical determinism and encourages the development of a special
language to describe ambiguous grammatical situations. The conceptual frame-
work of this language, we believe, is given in the fuzzy sets theory by L. Zadeh. We
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demonstrate below how this is achieved.
Let us turn to the definition of the set of semantic classes S and sets of partial
semantic classes S(fi) = {s : Fs = fisi}. If in the language processing there were
in principle a possibility of reduction of any state to the semantic net, the set S
could have been represented as a union of subsets of S(fi) that did not overlap, i.e.
the following formula would have been valid:
S = ∪fS(fi) ; S(fi) ∩ S(fj) =  when i 6= j (9)
The situation is quite different if we consider the possibility of the described
items that are both characterized by, for example, two (or more) values of a cer-
tain semantic category. Semantic condition s(X) of such a unit X will no longer
belong to only one of the subsets S(fi), but also two, and possibly more. A formal
mechanism for describing such a phenomena operates as follows. Define on the set
S = ∪fS(fi) the structure of a fuzzy set in the sense of Zadeh. For this purpose,
for each of the subsets S(fi) we define the membership function αi(s), which for
each s ∈ S(fi) takes a certain numerical value in the interval [0, 1]:
αi(s) ∈ [0, 1] (10)
Thus, we assume that if αi(s) = 1, then s is a net state. If αi(s) < 1, it
corresponds to the s, which is a component of the mixed state, while its second
component s′ (for two-component states) belongs to a subset of S(fj), i 6= j, with
the membership function value αj(s′), also less than 1, but such that the condition:
αi(s) + αj(s
′) = 1 (11)
Then each of the subsets S(fi) is transformed into a fuzzy set with the mem-
bership function αi(s):
S(fi)→ {S(fi), αi(s), s ∈ S(fi)} (12)
Pairs (s(fi), αi(s)) serve as elements of the fuzzy set. At the same time the
structure of the fuzzy set is induced on the entire set S as the union of fuzzy sets
(12) under condition (11). Membership function αi(s) in this case is interpreted as
a measure of acquisition of value properties fi of the category F by the semantic
state s. The function reaches the maximum value equal to 1 on net states, describing
words with clearly defined indicators of belonging to the corresponding semantic
category.
For words with mixed semantic states as following:
s(X) = α1(s1)s1(X) + α2(s2)s2(X) (13)
the value of α1(s1) demonstrates the degree to which the linguistic object X shows
the property of the value f1, while α2(s2), respectively, indicates the degree to which
X shows the property of the value f2. Condition (11), namely: α1(s1) +α2(s2) = 1
ensures the completeness of the semantic properties of the proposed facility and
the insularity of its semantic description.
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